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Abstract
This paper investigates the ethnic social network in Singapore’s resale public housing
market using a unique dataset containing the Cash-Over-Valuation (COV) information
for a sample of 73,107 resale public housing transactions from 2007 to 2012. We find
that the COV per square meter (psm), which represents a premium above the “objec-
tive” housing value, significantly increases with the concentration of buyers’ own ethnic
group at a housing block level. The results imply that buyers value housing blocks with
higher concentration of the same ethnicity group of households. However, the convexity
in COV premium suggests that the premium is too large to be fully explained by usual
ethnicity related factors, such as cultural amenities, preference for the own ethnicity
group, and supply constraint. We find significant evidence supporting the preference
matching between buyer and seller reinforced through the ethnic social network as a key
factor explaining the incremental COV premiums. The ethnic social network value is
only found in transaction prices, if buyers and sellers of the same ethnic group shar-
ing a common preference to trade with each other. We also find a high volume of the
within-ethnicity-group transactions both in the own-ethnicity concentrated blocks and
the other-ethnicity concentrated blocks, which is consistent with the ethnic social net-
work hypothesis. A potential disconnection due to ethnic-based matching in the search
process may cause segregation in the housing market.
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1. Introduction
Racial, or ethnic, segregation is a sensitive social issue in multi-racial societies that often
creates significant pricing impact on housing. The existence of racial segregation creates
race-based distortionary price effects in many housing neighborhoods in the US (King and
Mieszkowski (1973)). Being a social sorting phenomenon, households’ willingness to pay higher
prices to live with peers in the same ethno-linguistic group is found in Canada (Li (2014)).
In Singapore, the government has put in place policies to deliberately curb segregation in
the public housing market. It imposes ethnic-based supply quotas to prevent segregation by
selected ethnic groups at the block and precinct (neighborhood) levels and, as a result, creates
significant pricing impact (Wong (2013, 2014)).
Why do households pay premiums for houses in segregated neighborhoods? What are
possible channels/mechanisms that drive the ethnic-related housing price premiums? Various
supply-side and demand-side factors have been studied in the literature. The supply-limiting
mechanisms, such as the Ethnic Integration Quota (EIQ) policies on public housing in Singa-
pore (Wong (2013, 2014)) and the Whites’ discriminatory renting practices in the US (King
and Mieszkowski (1973)), push housing prices up in segregated neighborhoods.
There are two standard explanations for the price premium driven by demand-side segre-
gation. First, households prefer to live near both “hard” and “soft” ethnic-specific amenities.
The “hard” ethnic amenities, such as schools, places of worship, markets and others, are
orthogonal to the ethnic-neutral physical and spatial (location) variables usually found in
standard hedonic housing models. The “soft” ethnic amenities are activity-based social in-
teractions, such as sharing the same cultural interests, following the same religious faiths,
and/or joining the same social events including classes in dancing, Taiji and various sports
etc. Second, households prefer to live in blocks with more neighbors of the own ethnicity
group, and derive incremental utilities from purely interacting with the own ethnicity group
neighbors (Wong (2013)).
In this paper, we aim to investigate the ethnic social network as a demand-side driver
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on households’ residential location choice using a unique set of public housing transaction
data in Singapore. Here, the ethnic social network is a network within an ethnic group, i.e.
Chinese, Malay, or Indian, that promotes transactions within the ethnic group and the ethnic-
specific preference matching. Being a multi-racial society with three major ethnic groups,
Singapore provides several advantages to test the effect of the ethnic social network. First is
the clean identification of the ethnicity of buyers and sellers in the transactions. Second is
the existence of “cash-over-valuation” (COV) practice, which isolates unobservable value of
subjective preference in transactions.
In Singapore’s resale public housing market, it is a common practice for a seller to obtain
valuation on his/her house, and use the information to negotiate with a prospective buyer
and arrive at an agreed resale price. Our unique dataset contains both the transaction price
and also the corresponding “objective” value1 determined by a professional appraisal for each
sample house. The difference between a transaction price and a valuation is known as “cash-
over-valuation” (COV).2 COV is an equilibrium value negotiated between a buyer and a seller;
and it is independent of values for observable physical and location attributes. The buyer can
only pay the COV in cash; he can neither use savings in his/her pension savings in the Central
Provident Fund (CPF) account3, nor take additional loans from a commercial bank to pay
for the COV. Therefore, the COV is unique to each transaction; and it captures unobservable
values associated with social amenities, and other segregation-based factors, such as ethnic
social network. In this study, we match this unique COV data in public resale housing
1The objective value of a house is usually not observed ex-post in the data; but the literature uses standard
hedonic housing models to predict the objective prices, which should be correlated with the objective values
of the sample houses, if observable variables on physical and spatial attributes are well represented in the
models. Instead, we use the exact objective value that is actually used for negotiating transaction price.
2The cash-over-valuation practices have been disallowed by the Housing and Development Board (HDB),
the public housing authority of Singapore, with effects from 10 March 2014. A request for valuation is only
allowed after the option to purchase is granted by a seller to a potential buyer; and a seller can no longer
use the valuation information to negotiate up final prices. However, as the policy implementation date falls
outside our sample period, we cannot use the policy shock in our experimental designs.
3The CPF scheme is a compulsory scheme, which is set up to meet the medical, housing and retirement needs
of Singaporeans and permanent residents. Employers and employees are required to mandatorily contribute
37% of their gross income (employer: 17% and employee: 20%) as of 1 January 2016 for those below 55 years
into their respective CPF accounts.
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transactions to the personal demographic data of Singaporean residents, and use the matched
dataset to test for significance of social proximity premiums associated with cultural amenities
and ethnic social network.
Based on a sample of 73,107 resale public housing transactions with the COV data covering
the period from 2007 to 2012, we find that COV per square meter significantly increases in
housing blocks with a high concentration of buyers’ own ethnicity group. Using the ethnicity
quota as a discrete measure for the high ethnicity presence, we find that COV per square
meter significantly increases in housing blocks with the own ethnicity quota, but decreases
in housing blocks with the other ethnicity quota. Chinese buyers pay additional COV of
SGD44.20 per square meter for units in blocks with the Chinese quota, but pay SGD11.30
less in COV in blocks with Malay quota and SGD36.48 less in COV in blocks with Indian
quota. We find similar results for Malay buyers and Indian buyers. The COV premiums for
the own ethnicity quota and also the COV discounts for the other ethnicity quota cannot be
explained solely by the supply constraint (quota-binding) story. We next use the fraction of
ethnicity group in a block as a continuous measure for the ethnicity presence, and find that
COV per square meter (psm) increases significantly and monotonically with the fraction of
buyers’ own ethnicity group at a block level. We find that Chinese buyers pay SGD2.09 more
in COV (psm) for every 1% increase in Chinese residents in a block, SGD2.05 less in COV
(psm) for every 1% increase in Malay residents in a block, and SGD1.91 less in COV (psm)
for every 1% increase in Indian residents in a block.
Buyers pay COV (psm) premiums for the presence of a high fraction of ethnicity (either
discretely or continuously) of the same group as the buyers. However, the ethnicity preference
and ethnic amenities factors alone can not fully explain the convexity in the premiums. First,
using Singapore’s public housing market as a natural experiment setup, Wong (2013) finds
that buyers’ willingness to pay for ethnicity presence is an inverted U-shaped curve, such
that an addition of a new neighbor of the same ethnic group reduces the price controlling for
additional amenities associated with the new neighbor. The preference for neighbors of the
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same ethnicity group itself is unlikely to cause the convexity (exponential increases) in the
COV premiums. Second, ethnic-specific amenities increase with the concentration of a specific
ethnicity group in a block. But, in a typical self-contained public housing estate in Singapore,
the supply of local amenities, such as schools, supermarkets, clinics, hawker centres, sports
and recreational facilities is highly inelastic. Lands set aside for the amenities are limited; and
thus new ethnic-based amenities are not likely to increase proportionally with demand. The
ethnic amenities factor is thus not likely to explain the convexity in COV premiums.
This study hypothesizes the ethnic social network as one possible factor driving the convex
relationship between COV premium and ethnicity concentration in a housing block. The shar-
ing of “taste” in things like interior design and social amenities improves preference matching
between buyer and seller. The ethnic social network increases the ethnic preference matching
propensity in a housing block (neighborhood) with high concentration of the own-ethnicity
group, and in turn, supports the convex COV premiums. To investigate the effects of ethnic
social network, we construct the repeated-sale samples based on housing units sold twice or
more times in the public housing transaction data. We find 3,652 units sold twice, 99 units
sold for 3 times, and 3 units sold for 4 times in our samples. For each pair of the repeated
housing transactions, we identify the ethnicity of seller based on the buyer’s ethnicity of the
same unit in the previous sale. We are able to match the buyer and seller information for
3,859 repeated transactions, which include 289 cross-ethnicity transactions, and 3,570 within-
ethnicity transactions.
If the COV premiums are purely attributed to ethnic amenities and/or preference for the
own ethnicity in neighborhoods, buyers should not care about the ethnicity of sellers whom
they buy the units from. Using the repeat-sale samples, we find that having a buyer be-
ing matched with the ethnicity quota, for example, having a Chinese buyer in a Chinese
quota housing block, and/or having a buyer being matched with the high ethnicity fraction,
for example, a Chinese buyer in a high Chinese concentration block, are both not sufficient
conditions to generate a large (convex) COV premium. However, the within-ethnicity trans-
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actions, where buyers and sellers are from the same ethnicity group, are a necessary condition
to generate COV premiums that are exponentially correlated with the block-level ethnicity
concentration.
While the ethnic social network via the ethnic preference matching explains the convex
COV premium, it also has an implication on the trading volume. Matching of the ethnic-
specific taste should increase the propensity of buyer and seller of the same ethnicity group to
trade; and higher COV premiums in the transaction should reflect the ethnic-specific values.
Using all the repeat-sale samples, we first find that transactions are highly concentrated in
the within-ethnicity group. 94.2% of Chinese buyers (2583 out of 2741) purchase units from
Chinese sellers, 83.6% of Indian buyers (188 out of 225) purchase units from Indian sellers,
91.7% of Malay buyers (778 out of 848) purchase units from Malay sellers. The concentration
is even higher in blocks with the own-ethnicity quota as we expect. Chinese buyers purchase
units mostly from Chinese sellers in the Chinese quota binding blocks (98%). Combined
with the existence of significant COV premiums in the within-ethnicity transactions in own
(Chinese) quota binding blocks, this provides supportive evidence for the preference matching
story to support the ethnic social network hypothesis.
Ethnic preference matching in ethnic social network may seem similar to information
spillover story that happens among people speaking in the same language and/or with the
same education background (Bertrand et al. (2000)). The evidence so far coincides with the
case of ethnic-specific information flowing through the network. Interestingly, we also find the
same high concentration in other ethnicity buyers in blocks with Chinese binding quotas. In
these Chinese quota binding blocks, 81% of Indian buyers purchase units from Indian sellers,
and 90.1% of Malay buyers purchase units from Malay sellers. Unlike Chinese buyers who pay
COV premiums, Indian buyers and Malay buyers pay COV discounts for the within-ethnicity
group transactions in the Chinese quota binding blocks, which is inconsistent with the early
preference matching and information spillover stories. This suggests the effect of pure ethnic
social network after controlling for the preference matching and/or information spillover ef-
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fects. That is, the effect of pure ethnic social network simply increases the intensity of the
within-ethnicity transaction without having any premium associated with it. For example,
using the same real estate agents may increase the intensity, but may not necessarily in-
crease the COV in the within-ethnicity transactions.4 Or buyers and sellers may still be more
comfortable to communicate in their own native languages in housing transactions though
English is a prevalent business language spoken in Singapore’s society. The effect of pure
ethnic social network implies that the search friction in the housing market is one possible
factor contributing to racial segregation in the housing market.
This paper makes three contributions to the housing segregation and social interactions
literature. First, it is closely related to the studies on “taste for segregation” and pricing
of social amenities in housing markets. Wong (2013) finds significant distortionary pricing
effects caused by ethnic quota constraints in the Singapore’s resale public housing market.
However, due to data limitations, she was not able to match the buyer and seller’s ethnicity
in transactions to further pin down possible channels driving cultural value from social inter-
actions in housing choice decisions. Second, the paper contributes to the economic behavior
literature examining social interactions in activities ranging from financial decision (Hong
et al. (2004), Madrian and Shea (2001), Duflo and Saez (2002)) to social problems (Case and
Katz (1991), Glaeser et al. (1996)). We find new evidence of social interactions in explaining
high concentration of the within-ethnicity transactions in both the own-ethnic quota binding
housing blocks, and also the other-ethnic quota binding blocks. Third, the paper contributes
to the bargaining power literature of Harding et al. (2003), who find that bargaining power of
buyers and sellers are race-neutral. We, however, find evidence to suggest that social interac-
tions, though unobservable, add significant premiums in housing prices through the preference
matching effects, such as sharing of common “taste” or social amenities.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the housing literature on ethnic segre-
gation, and the broader literature on social interactions. Section 3 gives relevant information
4There are real estate agents and web-portals targeting only at selected ethnicity group. The within-
ethnicity effect is reinforced through these communication channels.
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on institutional features including the COV practices in the public housing market in Singa-
pore. Section 4 covers data descriptions and derivations of key variables. Section 5 discusses
the empirical methodologies. Section 6 analyzes empirical results. Section 7 concludes the
paper with discussions of relevant policy implications.
2. Literature Review
In laissez-faire private housing markets, where supply and demand are unregulated, race-
based discriminatory price effects exist in neighborhoods with the racial segregation (King
and Mieszkowski (1973)). There are two mechanisms causing price distortions in segregated
neighborhoods. The supply-side mechanism, if left alone, is not likely to produce enough
housing stocks to meet the demand by different ethnicity groups. If housing stocks were
segmented, increased demand by one ethnicity group in a sub-market is not likely to be met
by housing stocks of a different ethnicity group in another sub-market. White landlords’
reluctance to rent housing units to black tenants aggravates supply inelasticity and drives
up rents in the black housing sub-market (King and Mieszkowski (1973)). As a result, the
housing markets become segregated. In some countries, governments use race-based quotas
to encourage desegregation by deliberately restricting allocation of housing units to selected
ethnicity groups (Wong (2013, 2014)).
The demand-side mechanism induces sorting by residents causing segregation along the
ethnicity line. There are at least, but not exhaustively, three possible explanations for the
demand-induced segregation in the economic literature. First, King and Mieszkowski (1973)
argue that the “taste for segregation” by the whites relative to the “taste for integration” by
the blacks causes spatial variations in housing prices in the white and the black neighborhoods.
Segregated neighborhoods with a high concentration of a selected ethnicity group usually
attract more social and cultural amenities preferred by the dominant ethnic group (e.g. places
of worship, events and activities organized in the communities, etc.) (Li (2014)). The literature
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usually capitalizes the “taste of preference” into housing prices via the homogeneity in ethnic
composition (Coulson and Bond (1990); Macpherson and Sirmans (2001); Patrick and Kahn
(2005); Fu (2005); Clapp et al. (2008); Saiz and Wachter (2011); and Li (2014)), though solving
endogeneity issues remains a main concern. In this paper, we find that the matching ethnic
preference in the within ethnicity transactions is a key to create price premium associated
with ethnic amenities.
The second explanation is related to peer effects and social networks. The literature argues
that social interactions lead to two possible outcomes. One is related to information spillovers
(social network) (Bertrand et al. (2000)) and another is on conformance of a social norm.5 It is
empirically challenging to find an identification strategy that can separate the causal relations
between peer group behavior and individual behavior (Manski (1993)). Residents from the
same ethnic group, who share similar preferences, tend to gather in a neighbourhood with
selected ethnic-specific amenities. Therefore, it is hard to tell if individuals’ housing choice
is influenced by their peers in a neighbourhood. Most studies in the literature that examine
peers’ information interventions on individual behaviour could not reject the peer norm in
housing market, which are reflected in premiums paid for ethnic amenities in segregated
neighbourhoods. In this paper, we find evidence that the ethnic social network matters even
after controlling ethnic amenities and information spillovers.
The third demand-side segregation effect is more closely related the bargaining story (Hard-
ing et al. (2003)), but, to a lesser extent, related to information spillover (Bertrand et al.
(2000)). Fisman et al. (2017) show that social affinity and ethnic proximity generate informa-
tion benefits that outweigh mis-allocation costs of taste-based discrimination in loan outcomes
using loan data from an Indian bank in the study. In this paper, we find the evidence of ex-
istence of an ethnic social network that is not related to information spillover or information
friction.
5A growing literature documents peer norms in disparate economic activities, which include retirement
saving outcomes (Duflo and Saez (2002, 2003); Beshears et al. (2015)), stock market parcipation (Hong et al.
(2004); Brown et al. (2008)), corporate compensation and merger practices (Bizjak et al. (2009); Shue (2013)),
entrepreneurial risk-taking (Lerner and Malmendier (2013)), and risk aversion (Ahern et al. (2014)).
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3. Institutional Features in the Public Housing Market
in Singapore
In Singapore, public housing market provides houses for more than 80% of the population,
which as a result, contributes to the high home ownership rate of nearly 90% in the island-
state. The Housing and Development Board (HDB) is Singapore’s housing authority that
is responsible for the supply of public housing in the primary market, where public housing
flats are sold at concessionary prices to eligible residents. Currently, only Singaporean with
a monthly income of below $12,000 are eligible to buy subsidized housing flats directly from
the HDB. Besides the regulated primary public housing market, there is also a parallel resale
(secondary) market that operates in a laissez-faire environment, via which Singaporean and
permanent residents, who can not meet the eligibility criteria, can buy public housing flats at
market prices. Singaporean homeowners can sell their housing flats in the resale market after
fulfilling the minimum 5 years of occupation requirement.
There are two institutional features in the public housing market in Singapore that are
important for our experiment set-up, which include the Cash Over Valuation (COV) and the
Ethnic Integration Policy (EIP). The followings provide more details on these two features:
3.1. Cash Over Valuation (COV)
The COV phenomenon is unique to the secondary public housing market in Singapore. Prior
to 20146, it was a common practice for public housing owners to request to obtain an appraisal
of their housing flats from a panel of accredited appraisals (valuers) in the sale process. Based
on the valuation, they negotiate with prospective buyers to arrive at agreed transaction prices.
In the appraisal process, professional appraisals use past transactions of comparable houses
and make adjustment with respect to observable factors, which include housing attributes
6The HDB passed a new policy to ban the COV practices with effect from 10 March 2014, whereby
requests for an appraisal will not be allowed prior to the signing of an option to purchase (OTP); and the
COV information will no longer be made public by the HDB after the date.
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(such as unit size, age, etc.) and location and neighborhood amenities (such as distances to
nearby primary schools and subway stations, etc.), when determining the value of a subject
house. The appraisal process is likened the standard hedonic models, where quality-adjusted
predicted prices (objective value) are estimated. Unobservable factors, such as cultural ameni-
ties or social interactions within ethnicity groups, which are also key price determinants, are,
however, neglected in the derivation of objective values for subject houses.
Difference between the final agreed price (which is considered as a willing-buyer’s and a
willing-seller’s price that is freely negotiated and determined on “a willing buyer and a willing
seller” basic, or the subjective value) and the appraisal value (the objective value), if existing in
a transaction, is known as the COV in resale public housing market. Therefore, COV captures
marginal premiums that potential buyers pay for factors other than hedonic attributes and
neighborhood amenities; and these factors may include intensity of social interactions and
cultural amenities.
A buyer is expected to pay the COV, or the cash premium by cash in an arm’s length
transaction. Note that paying COV is not a necessarily condition for a resale purchase. The
public housing agency, Housing and Development Board (HDB), comments in its InfoWEB
that “resale price may be above, at or below market valuation depending on the outcome of
negotiation between a buyer and seller, and there is no need to pay any COV should the resale
transaction be at or below market valuation of the unit”7
Due to the large sum of upfront cash payment, the COV is economically burdensome to
buyers. Buyers obtain loans from either HDB or commercial banks when they purchase public
housing but the loans do not cover the COV payment. In case of HDB loans, the appraisal
values are considered as the fair value by the HDB, when granting concessionary interest rate
loans to buyers.8 HDB caps the loan ceiling at 90% of the sale price or the appraisal value,
7HDB InfoWeb, “Median Cash-Over-Valuation (COV) by Town and Flat Type,” September 2011. Source:
https://weaponlcp.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/cov.pdf
8The HDB concessionary interest rate is pegged at 0.1% above the long-term saving rates of the CPF
Ordinary Account (the rate has remained constant at 2.5% since 1993), and the loan term is capped at 25
years. With effects from 28 August 2013, the loan to value ratio for commercial bank loans is capped at 80%,
based on the sale price or the appraisal value, whichever is lower; for loans with a payment term of below 25
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whichever is lower. However, the 90% HDB loan ceiling is hardly met in practice, because
the loan is only disbursed after a borrower has drawn down all the savings in his/her Central
Provident Fund (CPF) Ordinary Account to reduce the loan quantum (excluding COV). COV
will need to be paid out from his own cash reserve.
Buyers could also consider commercial bank loans as an alternative, which usually offer
more flexible and competitive terms. The interest rates are usually pegged to selected mar-
ket interest rate indicators. Like HDB, commercial banks also use the appraisal values to
determine loan quantum for granting loans (with a loan term of less than 25 years), which is
currently set at 80% of the market price or the appraisal value, whichever is lower (with effect
from 28 August 2013). For the remainder 20% of the (appraisal) value (if lower), a borrower
is required to make a minimum 5% of payment in cash, and he/she can use his savings to
pay for the balance of 15% of the value, provided there were sufficient savings in his/her CPF
Ordinary Account. This means that for a resale public housing flat buyer who chooses a
commercial bank loan, he/she needs to fork out a sum of cash upfront to pay for the COV9,
if positive, and the 5% payment, which is not covered by a bank loan, nor by his/her CPF
savings.
COV in the resale HDB market provides a significant indicator of housing affordability,
where potential buyers, who do not have enough upfront cash are likely to be excluded from
the market. The positive COV trend has persisted in the resale public housing market since
2007 (Lee and Yeo (2013)). The rising COV has triggered concerns of many buyers, especially
younger ones, for making public resale housing more unaffordable. The government, however,
was mindful about unreasonable demand for high COV by some sellers, which could drive
prices off the fundamental. On March 11, 2014, HDB acted by scrapping the COV practices,
stopping sellers from obtaining an appraisal report for their flats and use it as a base price to
negotiate with buyers on the sale price.10 The appraisal report could only be obtained after
years.
9He/she is not allowed to use CPF savings to pay for COV.
10Sumita Sreedharan,“HDB resale: Parties must agree on price before valuation,” Today Online, March 11,
2014.
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the two parties have agreed on the final sale price.
3.2. Ethnic Integration Policy (EIP)
On March 1, 1989, Singapore government introduced the Ethnic Integration Policy (EIP)
aimed to prevent the formation of racial enclaves in the public housing estate. As a multi-
racial society, the government takes a strong stand on maintaining a balanced mix of ethnic
groups at the neighborhood and within the block levels, which is deemed to be a key to
fostering harmonious living among ethnic communities in public housing. The allocation of
new public housing flats adheres strictly to the neighborhood and block quotas set for each
ethnic group as in Table 1. Being the largest ethnic group in the country, the Chinese ethnic
quotas are set at 84% and 87% at the neighborhood and block levels, respectively. The
Malay ethnic enclave must not exceed 22% and 25% at the neighborhood and the block levels,
respectively. With effect from 5 March 2010, HDB increased the Indian/Other ethnic group
limits from 10% to 12% at the neighborhood level and from 13% to 15% at the block level.
During the selection of new flats, buyers of a selected ethnic group will not be allowed to
book a flat, if the ethnic quota has been reached. The EIP also applies to resale flats and
rental flats built by HDB. We identify those housing blocks with ethnic ratios (concentration)
exceeding the ceiling stipulated for the respective ethnic groups as quota binding blocks. For
example, in a Chinese-quota binding block having a Chinese residents’ concentration at or
above 87%, a prospective Chinese buyer is not allowed to buy a resale housing flat from a
non-Chinese seller within the block. However, this Chinese buyer could still buy a resale
flat from another Chinese seller within the block. Wong (2013, 2014) use the EIP setup in
Singapore exploiting the discontinuous price around the threshold for her studies.
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4. Data
We obtain the data of public housing resale transactions in Singapore for the period of 2007
to 2012 from Singapore Real Estate Exchange (SRX), a commercial real estate information
exchange that is formed by a consortium of 16 leading real estate agencies in Singapore (as
of December 2016). The data consist of information on date of transaction, appraisal price,
COV, and information on housing attributes, such as address, postal code, floor, unit size, and
property type. We merge the HDB resale transaction data with a large proprietary database
of more than 2 million Singaporean residents. The data contain detailed personal demographic
information that identifies buyer attributes for all household members, such as gender, race,
and date of birth .
4.1. Ethnicity of Buyers
Since transactions are by household, we need to construct household-level ethnicity. Using the
individual-level ethnicity and date of birth data, we set up our identifications of the ethnicity
of buyers in our databases. For each resale transaction, we construct the household-level
ethnicity indicator using following rules: First, if all members in a family (as identified by
a common home address and transaction) are from a same ethnicity group, we assign the
ethnicity to the household/family. For example, if all members in a family are Chinese, we
define the household as a Chinese household. One ethnicity household constitutes about 89%
of the resale transaction sample. Second, for families with mixed ethnicity members (which
could be due to cross-ethnic marriage), we assign the ethnicity based on the majority ethnic
group in the households, which is defined as having more than 50% of the members belong
to the ethnicity group. This sample group constitutes about 6% of the transaction sample
in the data. Third, if the number of family members are tied between two ethnicity groups,
we follow the ethnicity identity of the eldest member in the household. This sample group
constitutes about 4% of the sample households in the data. We drop the remainder of about
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1% of the sample, of which we cannot assign the household-level ethnicity following the above
rules. After removing data with incomplete information on COV, unit size, and ethnicity, we
retain a final sample of 73,107 transactions for our empirical analyses.
4.2. Summary Statistics
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the full sample of 73,107 resale public housing
transactions. Panel A shows the distributions of transactions by buyer ethnicity, which con-
sist of 53,229 transactions by Chinese buyers (72.81%), 15,184 transactions by Malay buyers
(20.77%), and 3,801 transactions by Indian buyers (5.2%).
Panel B reports the summary statistics for variables of interest. The appraisal price is, on
average, estimated at Singapore Dollar (SGD) 382,406, and the value ranges from SGD169,000
to SGD750,000.11 The average COV is estimated at SGD24,136, which is about 6% of the
average appraisal price. COV varies widely from -SGD22,000 to SGD90,000. The appraisal
value per square meter is estimated at SGD 3,927, on average; and the COV per square
meter (COV (psm)) is estimated at SGD 253, on average. Given the high-density nature of
Singapore’s public housing, the average floor level (height) is 7.55, and it ranges from 1 to 40.
The average unit size is 99 square meters (sqm); and it ranges from 31 sqm to 243 sqm.
Figure 1 reports the histogram of COV (psm). Vertical red-dot line indicates the average
COV (psm), which is SGD253. We first find significant fraction of transactions at zero COV
(psm), indicating that many of transaction prices equal to objective valuations. We next find
that COV (psm) is most likely to be positive. If the buyer and seller matching is random and
COV (psm) is an idiosyncratic noise, we should observe symmetric distribution around zero.
Figure 2 show the monthly time-series plots for average unit COV (psm) (dashed line)
and the average ratio of COV to total transaction price (solid line). Here the transaction
price is the sum of appraisal value and COV. We find significant time variation in COV (psm)
from SGD43 to SGD412 during the sample period. The ratio of COV to total transaction
11Appraisal Value and COV are winsorized at the 1% level on both tails for robustness.
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price shows the weightage of COV in total transaction price, which ranges between 1% to 8%
during the sample period. Note that the time-series variation in COV (psm) shows similar
pattern with the time-series variation in the ratio of COV to total transaction price. That is,
the fluctuation in transaction price is mostly coming from the fluctuation in COV.
Panel B of Table 2 also reports the summary statistics of other typical variables that may
affect the value of properties. First is the distance to nearest MRT. This is the linear distance
of the sample housing block to the nearest mass rapid transit (MRT) station; and the average
distance is 890 meters, and ranges from 4 meters to 3,520 meters. Second is the quality of
primary school education, where the distance-based allocation policy is implemented by the
government for selected school placements (Agarwal et al. (2016)), by sorting the home-school
distances into two categories: (a) housing blocks within 1 kilometre (km) radius from the
school; and (b) housing blocks between 1 km and 2 km. We measure a school quality, based
on the Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE) results12 and average the rankings of
primary schools located within 1km and 1-2km into the primary school quality indices by
blocks. Note that higher Primary School Quality indicates better primary education around
the blocks and there are some blocks without any primary school within 2km.
Panel C of Table 2 reports on distributions of the sample transactions sorted by property
type. HDB classifies the housing type by the room number into 1-bedroom to 5-bedroom types,
and other large flat types, such as “HUDC”, “Jumbo” and “Executive”. 4-bedroom flats is
the most popular housing type constituting about 37% of the total transactions, followed
by 3-bedroom and 5-bedroom housing types constituting 26.48% and 26.39% of the total
transactions, respectively.
12We use the data published by a commercial online education consultant in Singapore, “Kiasuparents.com”,
and construct the School Quality Index using the (standardized) academic performance score. Source:
“https://www.kiasuparents.com/kiasu/article/singapore-primary-schools-ranked-by-academic-excellence/”.
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4.3. Ethnicity Concentration
From the proprietary resident database13, we construct household-level ethnicity for all res-
idents in blocks applying the same rules as above and aggregate them into two block-level
variables: the quota-binding indicator and the segregation measures (by fractions of residents
of selected ethnicity groups).
In Singapore, the postal-code system assigns a unique 6-digit postal code for each housing
block; and there are a total of 8,194 blocks each identified by a unique postal code in the
resident database. Based on the postal-code identifier, we construct the ethnicity measures
based on the fraction of Chinese, Malay, and Indian residents in the total resident sample
sorted at the block-level and by year. The composition of Singapore’s residents by the ethnicity
group has remained rather stable since independence in 1965 as in Figure 3, with Chinese
forming the majority group, followed by Malays and Indians. The ethnic composition ratios
are estimated at 74.4%, 13.5%, and 9.1%, respectively, during the our sample period 2007-
2012. The block-level ethnic ratios are also almost time-invariant. Based on our resident
database, we report the summary statistics of the fractions of ethnicity in blocks in Panel A
of Table 3. The median ratio for Chinese is slightly higher at 81.38%, followed by 13.89% for
Malays, and the median of 3.33% for Indians is lower than the national average.
As discussed in the early section, the EIP, existed since 1989, has played an instrumental
role in upholding racial harmony and integration in Singapore. When a block quota is binding
for a selected ethnic group, any transaction that increases the ethnicity presence in a block
will not be approved by the HDB. Having an ethnicity quota in a block means that the block is
at the right-tailed distribution in term of the ethnicity presence. We define block-level quota-
binding indicators that serve as an alternative discrete measure of the ethnicity segregation
(high concentration) in a block, which supplements the continuous block-level ethnic ratio
measure. If more than 87% of the residents within a block is composed of Chinese, the block
13The database covers more than 2 million of Singaporean citizens and permanent residents living in Sin-
gapore. The database provides demographic and ethnicity details of household members, who are above 18
years old.
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is identified as the Chinese quota-binding block, and non-Chinese households from the same
block cannot sell their units to Chinese buyers. There are 2,280 blocks (postal codes) with
Chinese quota-binding constraints out of 8,194 blocks, which are top 25% blocks in Panel A
of Table 2. The Malay quota is set at 25% and 1,368 of the blocks (about top 10% blocks) are
subject to the Malay-quota-binding constraints, such that Malay households in these blocks
could not sell their public housing flats to non-Malay buyers. For Indians, the quota has been
raised from 13% to 15% with effect from March 12, 2010; and only 90 blocks are subject to
the Indian-quota-binding constraints before the change, and 71 blocks face the quota-binding
constraints after the quota has been revised in 2010. Ethnicity quotas are also widely spread
in Singapore as in Appendix Table 1.
Panel B of Table 3 reports the determinants of ethnicity presence in blocks. Columns (1)-
(3) show the results using fractions of ethnicity group as dependent variables. In column (1),
dependent variable is the fraction of Chines in a block. Independent variables are Distance to
nearest MRT, Primary School Quality, Average Unit Size in a block, and Maximum floor in
a block. We find that the fraction of Chinese increases with shorter distance to MRT, better
primary school quality, higher the maximum floor of the building, and more smaller sized unit
in a building. Column (2) reports the result with the fraction of Malay as dependent variable.
We find that the fraction of Malay increases in an opposite direction from Chinese: longer
distance to MRT, poorer primary education quality, and lower height of building. Column (3)
reports the result with the fraction of Indian as dependent variable. Indian fraction increases
with shorter distance to MRT, but decreases with school quality and height of building.
Columns (4)-(6) show the logit results using ethnicity quota as dependent variable. Column
(4) reports the result for Chinese quota, column (5) reports result for Malay quota, and column
(6) reports result for Indian quota. We find similar results as in columns (1)-(3). That is, on
average, the blocks with higher Chinese presence are more valuable blocks: closer to MRT,
better education quality, and higher building. This partially explains why Chinese buyer pays
highest price on average.
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5. Empirical Methodology
The identifications of the ethnicity of buyers, the EIP (desegregation) policy and the presence
of COV are unique institutional features in Singapore’s resale housing market that jointly
contribute to the setting up of a clean natural experiment to empirically test economic values
of cultural affinity and social interactions.
The COV data are unique to Singapore’s housing market. Defined as differences between
resale transaction prices and appraisal values, the COV data are used in our study to di-
rectly disentangle values associated with observable and unobservable factors. Professional
appraisals use past transactions of comparable houses to derive objective values for houses
taking into account observable physical and neighbourhood attributes, whereas the subjective
transaction prices that match a buyer’s willingness to pay and a seller’s price expectation
capture other factors that are not directly observed in the appraisal process. These are not
idiosyncratic factors, or random errors in distributions that can be cancelled out, on average;
but they are orthogonal factors that matter in buyer-seller negotiations. These unobservable
factors potentially include “taste for segregation” and social interactions that are specific to
unique to buyers of selected ethnicity groups. For example, a Chinese buyer may pay more for
a house from a Chinese seller, because interior decoration or designs of the house are closer
to his/her taste and preference.
In our empirical models, we use two variables to represent the ethnicity presence within a
public housing block. First, we use a discrete variable to identify housing blocks with a binding
ethnicity-quota, which has a value of 1, if a block is subject to the ethnicity quota constraint,
i.e. the existing ethnic ratio has reached the limit set by the EIP; and 0 otherwise. Second,
we use a continuous measure which is the fraction of households of a selected ethnicity group
in each block. Note that the continuous variable on ethnicity fraction captures the monotonic
increase in intensity of social interactions associated with the ethnicity presence in a block;
whereas, the ethnic quota captures the discontinuity in the social interaction at the threshold
of the ethnicity quota.
18
If the value of social interaction exists, it will be materialized through the buyers’ and
sellers’ willingness to trade, COVpsm, if the buyer is from the ethnicity group. We use both
of measures for the block-level ethnicity presence independently, and interact the variables
separately with an indicator for buyer ethnicity to quantify the economic effects of social in-
teraction. The buyer ethnicity indicator has a value of 1, if a housing is bought by a buyer of
the defined ethnicity group k, where k = [Chinese, Malay, and Indian]; and otherwise 0. With
COVpsm as dependent variable, the model specification is written as:
COVpsm = α+β ·Xi,t+γ ·IBuyerEthnicity+ψ·Ethnicity Presence×IBuyerEthnicity+λb+τt+i,b,t
where Xi,t is a vector of regressors for hedonic attributes, such as unit size, floor, and property
type dummy. λb is the block fixed effects and τt is the year and month fixed effects that are
included to control for spatial heterogeneity and time variations, respectively, in the models.
Due to block fixed effect, block-level Ethnicity Presence variables are not estimated. But the
interaction term, [Ethnicity Presence ×IBuyerEthnicity], still can be identified separately for the
three ethnicity groups of buyers: Chinese, Malay and Indian.
While our original transaction data do not contain seller identities, we could, however,
infer the sellers’ demographic details from repeated transactions, i.e. houses that sell at least
twice during the sample period. In the repeated sale samples, the buyers in the first sales
(or the early sales, if sold more than twice) are deemed to be the sellers for the subsequent
(repeated) sales. The buyer demographic information including ethnicity from the first sales
are used to identify sellers’ profiles. We construct an ethnicity matching indicator that has a
value of 1 for within-ethnicity transactions between buyers and sellers of the same ethnicity
group; and 0 otherwise for cross-ethnicity transactions, if buyers and sellers are from different
ethnicity groups. The within-ethnicity indicator is used as a proxy for the preference matching
or information spillovers within ethnicity in the housing search process in the model.
We extend our analyses by replacing the IBuyerEthnicity in previous specification with the
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Within Ethnicity dummy, and test the differential effects of the “peer” or “ethnicity” prefer-
ence matching on buyers’ COVpsm in housing transactions with respect to ethnicity presence
in housing blocks. As in the previous specification, we use two different measure of ethnicity
presence: ethnicity quota and the fraction of ethnicity in a block. The model specification is
written as:
COVpsm = α+β ·Xi,t+γ ·IWithinEthnicity+ψ ·Ethnicity Presence×IWithinEthnicity+τt+i,b,t
where Xi,t is a vector of regressors for hedonic attributes, such as unit size, floor, property
type dummy, distance to nearest MRT, primary school quality around the block. τt is the
year and month fixed effects that are included to control for time variations in the models.
Due to the sample size issue, we do not include block fixed effect in this specification but we
add block-level controls to account for other factors that may affect on COV (psm).
The preference matching effect will be significant in explaining variations in COVpsm, if
buyers of the same ethnicity group are able to improve likelihoods of preference matching in
resale transactions to agree on higher COVpsm. The effects are also expected to be larger for
transactions with higher ethnicity presence i.e. ethnic quota-binding blocks or high ethnicity
fraction in a block.
6. Empirical Results
6.1. Ethnicity Presence and COV premium
We use the full sample of resale public housing transactions to test the COV premium asso-
ciated with ethnicity presence in a block. Two variables are used to represent the presence of
an ethnicity group at the block level in the models: 1) a dummy variable on the presence of
binding ethnicity quota in a block and 2) the fraction of an ethnicity group in a block. We
interpret the ethnicity-binding quota indicator as a measure of discontinuity at the tailed-end
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(extreme) of the distributions of ethnicity presence.
Table 4 shows the panel regression results on interactive effects of the buyer ethnicity and
the ethnicity-binding quota dummy on the COV premiums. COV (psm) is the dependent
variable, and the variable of interest is the interactive terms of buyer ethnicity (I Buyer
Ethnicity) and ethnicity quotas (I Ethnicity Quota). Column (1) shows the result on Chinese
buyers, where I Buyer Ethnicity equals to 1, if the buyer is Chinese; and 0 otherwise. I Buyer
Ethnicity is interacted with dummy variables for ethnicity quota: I Chinese Quota, I Malay
Quota, and I Indian Quota. We include the block fixed effects. The ethnicity quota dummy
variables are not estimated, except for the Indian Quota dummy with a time-series change in
threshold in 2010. We include the year and the month fixed effects, and the property type
fixed effects. Other independent variables include unit size and floor level.
We find that Chinese buyers pay higher COV (psm) of SGD44.20 for housing units in
Chinese quota-binding blocks than non-quota blocks, but lower COV (psm) for housing units
in other ethnic quota-binding blocks. Chinese buyers pay SGD11.30 and SGD36.48 lower
in COV (psm) for housing units in Malay quota-binding blocks and Indian quota-binding
blocks, respectively, relative to the control blocks without Malay and Indian quota-binding
constraints. This indicates that Chinese buyers pay positive premiums only in the own-
ethnicity quota-binding blocks, but negative premium in other ethnicity quota-binding blocks.
The control variables are all significant and with the correct signs. The negative coefficient
on the size variable indicates diminishing effects of unit size on COV per unit area; and the
positive coefficient on the floor (height) variable indicates high premiums for housing units at
higher floors that are windy and have better view.
Column (2) shows the results on Malay buyers, where I Buyer Ethnicity equals to 1, if
the buyer is Malay; and 0 otherwise. We find that Malay buyers pay higher COV (psm) of
SGD14.86 for housing units in Malay quota-binding blocks, but lower COV (psm) of SGD46.18
for housing units in Chinese quota-binding blocks. Malay also pays a positive premium in
Indian quota-binding blocks; but the result is insignificant. But this effect is partly driven by
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the fact that 24 Malay quota-binding blocks are also Indian quota-binding blocks. Column (3)
shows the results on Indian buyers, where I Buyer Ethnicity equals to 1, if the buyer is Indian;
ands 0 otherwise. We find that Indian buyers pay SGD57.34 lower in COV (psm) for housing
units in Chinese quota-binding blocks. The COV premiums for housing units in Indian quota-
binding and Malay quota-binding blocks are both positive, but statistically insignificant. Note
that there are only 52 observations of Indian buyers in Indian quota-binding blocks in our
sample.
Our results are unlikely to be related to the supply constraint story, which, if exists, should
only apply to the “own” (same) ethnicity group in the quota-binding blocks, and not to other
ethnicity group. For example, in a Malay quota-binding block, prospective Malay buyers (own-
ethnicity group) are not allowed to buy flats from non-Malay sellers, but the restriction does
not apply to other non-quota binding buyers, such as Chinese. We find significant incremental
effects in the own ethnic quota-binding blocks; and negative (opposite) effects in the other
ethnic quota-binding blocks.
Table 5 reports the panel regression results on interactive effects of the buyer ethnicity
and the (continuous) ethnicity fraction on the COV premiums. COV (psm) is the main
dependent variable; and the variable of interest is the interactive terms of buyer ethnicity
(I Buyer Ethnicity) and the ethnicity fraction in a block (Fraction of Ethnicity). Panel A
reports the results with the block fixed effects. Columns (1)-(3) report the results on Chinese
buyers. In Column (1), we interact I Buyer Ethnicity with Fraction of Chinese. Due to the
block fixed effects, the Fraction of Chinese itself is not estimated. We include the year and
the month fixed effects, and the property type fixed effects. We find that, on average, Chinese
buyers pay SGD2.09 more in COV (psm) for every 1% increase in Chinese in the block. We
interact I Buyer Ethnicity with Fraction of Malay in column (2) and with Fraction of Indian
in column (3). We find that Chinese buyers pay SGD2.05 less in COV (psm) for every 1%
increase in Malay in the block, and SGD1.91 less in COV (psm) for every 1% increase in
Indian in the block. The unit size and floor level variables are all significant with the correct
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signs.
Columns (4)-(6) report the results on Malay buyers. In Column (5), we interact I Buyer
Ethnicity with Fraction of Malay. We find that, on average, Malay buyers pay SGD2.20 more
in COV (psm) for every 1% increase in Malay in the block. We interact I Buyer Ethnicity
with Fraction of Chinese in column (4) and with Fraction of Indian in column (6). We find
that Malay buyers pay SGD2.14 lower in COV (psm) for every 1% increase in Chinese in the
block, and SGD1.70 more in COV (psm) for every 1% increase in Indian in the block.
Columns (7)-(9) report the results on Indian buyers. In Column (9), we interact I Buyer
Ethnicity with Fraction of Indian. We find that, on average, Indian buyers pay SGD0.59 more
in COV (psm) for every 1% increase in Indian without statistical significance. We interact
I Buyer Ethnicity with Fraction of Chinese in column (7), and with Fraction of Malay in
column (8). We find that Indian buyers pay SGD2.49 less in COV (psm) for every 1% increase
in Chinese, and SGD2.68 more in COV (psm) for every 1% increase in Malay in the block.
Panel B of Table 5 reports the results without the block fixed effects. All the specifications
are the same as in Panel A, except for the block fixed effects and additional block-level controls,
such as distance to nearest MRT, qualities of primary schools within 1 km radius and within
1-2 km radius. Columns (1)-(3) reports the results on Chinese buyers. In Column (1), we
interact I Buyer Ethnicity with Fraction of Chinese. Without the block fixed effects, we
estimate the Fraction of Chinese itself. We also include the year and the month fixed effects,
and the property type fixed effects. Other independent variables include unit size, floor level,
distance to MRT, and quality of primary schools around the blocks. We find that, on average,
Chinese buyers pay SGD2.26 more in COV (psm) for every 1% increase in Chinese in the
block. We interact I Buyer Ethnicity with Fraction of Malay in column (2), and with Fraction
of Indian in column (3). We find that Chinese buyers pay SGD2.29 less in COV (psm) for
every 1% increase in Malay in the block, and SGD0.76 less in COV (psm) for every 1% increase
in Indian in the block. The control variables are all significant and with the correct signs. We
find positive premiums associated with shorter distance to MRT and better quality of primary
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school.
Columns (4)-(6) report the results on Malay buyers. In Column (5), we interact I Buyer
Ethnicity with Fraction of Malay. We find that, on average, Malay buyers pay SGD2.53 more
in COV (psm) for every 1% increase in Malay in the block. We interact I Buyer Ethnicity
with Fraction of Chinese in column (4), and with Fraction of Indian in column (6). We find
that Malay buyers pay SGD2.35 less in COV (psm) for every 1% increase in Chinese in the
block, and SGD0.71 less in COV (psm) for every 1% increase in Indian in the block.
Columns (7)-(9) report the results on Indian buyers. In Column (9), we interact I Buyer
Ethnicity with Fraction of Indian. We find that, on average, Indian buyers pay SGD2.41 more
in COV (psm) for every 1% increase in Indian in the block. We interact I Buyer Ethnicity
with Fraction of Chinese in column (7), and with Fraction of Malay in column (8). We find
that Indian buyers pay SGD2.40 less in COV (psm) for every 1% increase in Chinese in the
block, and SGD2.30 more in COV (psm) for every 1% increase in Malay in the block.
Using both the continuous ethnicity fraction variable and the discrete ethnic quota-binding
variable, the results show positive and economically significant COV premiums that represent
strong preference for social amenities and interactions in the public resale housing market.
The results imply that buyers pay premiums above the appraisal (“objective”) housing values
to live close to neighbourhoods with a high concentration of households of the same ethnicity
type. The COV premiums that capture the effects of social and cultural affinity are large,
and persistent over time.
6.2. Convexity in COV premium
In the previous section, we find that buyers pay higher COV (psm) for ethnic presence of the
own ethnicity group in a block. We next analyse the functional form of increments in the
COV (psm).
First, we plot average COV (psm) paid by buyers of a selected ethnic group by the fraction
of ethnicity presence and find a positive convex relationship between the COV (psm) and the
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fraction of own ethnicity group, but a negative concave relationship between the COV (psm)
and the fraction of other ethnicity group. Panel A of Figure 4 reports the average COV (psm)
paid by Chinese, Malay, and Indian buyers for each increment in the fraction of Chinese. We
show non-parametric smoothing fit (locally weighted regression, LWR) on the scatter plots.
The first graph shows the average COV (psm) that Chinese buyer pays for the fraction of
Chinese residents in a block. The LWR fit shows a convex relationship between the fraction
of Chinese and the COV (psm) that Chinese buyers pay. For Malay and Indian buyers as in
the second and third graphs in Panel A, the relationships are negative and concave. Panel B
reports the average COV (psm) paid by Chinese, Malay, and Indian buyers for each increment
in the fraction of Malay. We find a convex relationship between the fraction of Malay in a
block and the COV (psm) that Malay buyer pays. Chinese buyers and Indian buyers pay less
COV (psm) as the fraction of Malay increases. Panel C reports the average COV (psm) paid
by Chinese, Malay, and Indian buyers for each increment in the fraction of Indian. We find a
weak convex relationship between the fraction of Indian in a block and the COV (psm) that
Indian buyer pays. Chinese buyers and Malay buyers pay less COV (psm) as the fraction of
Indian increases.
Table 6 reports the panel regression results of buyer’s ethnicity and the presence of same
ethnicity group in the block, and its square term. The dependent variable is COV (psm), and
the variable of interest is the interaction between buyer ethnicity and the square term of the
fraction of the ethnicity in a block. Columns (1)-(3) report the results with the block fixed
effects. Column (1) includes a dummy variable for Chinese buyer (I Buyer Ethnicity) and
interactions of the Chinese buyer dummy with the fraction of Chinese and its square term.
The independent variables include Size (sqm) and Unit Floor. We also include the year fixed
effects, the month fixed effects, and the property type fixed effects. Since we have the block
fixed effects, we cannot identify the effect of ethnicity fraction and its square term, but we
can still identify the interactions. We find significant effect of the squared fraction of Chinese
Ethnicity in a block on COV (psm), which supports the convex relationship between the buyer
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ethnicity and the fraction of own ethnicity in a block. This coincides with Figure 4. Column
(2) is on Malay buyer, and column (3) is on Indian buyer. We find significant evidence of the
convexity in the relationships. Columns (4)-(6) report results without the block fixed effects.
Specifications are similar to columns (1)-(3) except for the block fixed effects and additional
independent variables, such as distance to nearest MRT, primary school quality within 1 km
radius and within 1-2 km radius. The results are similar to those found in (1)-(3). The control
variables are all significant and with the correct signs.
How should we interpret the strong convexity in COV (psm) with respect to the fraction
of ethnicity in a block? The positive COV (psm) premium associated with the high ethnicity
presence (either discrete or continuous) may arise through many social interaction factors,
such as ethnic amenities and social network. It is thus challenging to isolate a mechanism
from the others. The first potential factor is the preference for ethnicity in the neighbor-
hoods. Controlling for all other factors i.e. cultural amenities, buyers pay more to have more
households of the same ethnicity group. Using the similar set up in Singapore public housing
market, Wong (2013) finds an inverted U-shape effect of the ethnicity presence on buyers’
willingness to pay controlling for the difference in ethnic amenities. The preference for ethnic-
ity itself cannot explain the convexity in our results; it, however, could amplify the convexity
in results after controlling for ethnicity preference.
The second potential factor is the existence of cultural amenities associated with a high
fraction of an ethnicity group in a block. Integration of ethnic preference increases the ethnic-
specific amenities, which will be more valuable for particular ethnic group. However, the
ethnic-based amenities are unlikely to increase exponentially in public housing estates in Sin-
gapore. The supply of new amenities, such as schools, supermarkets, clinics, hawker centres,
and sports and recreational facilities, are limited by lands available in the housing estates.
The ethnic-based amenity supply is unlikely to drive the convexity in the results.
The last factor this paper claims is the ethnic social network, which affects COV premiums
through trading behavior in the ethnic social network. The preference matching between buyer
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and seller is one example of the ethnic social network. The sharing of “taste” in things, such as
interior design and social amenities between buyers and sellers of the same ethnicity group can
explain the positive COV premiums. A high fraction of the own ethnicity group exponentially
increases the chance of matching ethnic preference through the ethnic social network, which
could explain the convexity in COV premium. Figure 1 shows positive COV payments in
most of the transaction, and the results indicate that transactions are not randomly matched,
but selected among those who agree on the value, which may include an ethnic-specific value
for the unit. We will further explore the role of ethnicity matching in COV premiums in the
next section.
6.3. Robustness: Temporal Variations in COV Premium
Do COV premiums vary over time? We include a triple interactive term comprising the
ethnicity variable, the ethnic quota-binding dummy and the year dummy to the specification
of Table 4 to capture the year by year variations in COV (psm). The detailed panel regression
results are reported in Appendix (Table A2). Based on the coefficients from the regression,
we plot the temporal variations of COV premiums (or discounts) associated with the within
ethnicity quota in Figure 5. The three panels in Figure 5 represent the three comparable
ethnicity quota-year effects sorted by the buyer ethnicity groups.
Panel A reports the differences in COV (psm) that Chinese buyers pay in each ethnicity
quota. The black solid line shows the average COV (psm) that Chinese buyers pays in all
blocks; the red long-dashed line shows the average COV (psm) that Chinese buyer pays in
Chinese quota blocks; and the blue short-dashed line shows the average COV (psm) that
Chinese buyer pays in Malay quota blocks; and the green dotted line shows the average
COV (psm) that Chinese buyer pays in Indian quota blocks. We find that Chinese buyers
consistently pay more for comparable housing units in the Chinese quota blocks (red long-
dashed line) than the average (black solid line); but consistently pay below the average COV
premiums (black solid line) in Malay quota blocks (blue short-dashed line) and in Indian quota
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(green dotted line) for comparable housing units.
Panel B reports the difference in COV (psm) that Malay buyers pays in each ethnicity
quota. Malay buyers pay more COV (psm) than the average in Malay quota-binding blocks,
but pay below the average COV psm in Chinese quota-binding blocks. Malay buyers pay more
than average for the units in Indian quota for some years, which may be due to the fact that
there exist some blocks with both Malay and Indian quotas. Panel C reports the difference in
COV (psm) that Indian buyers pays in each ethnicity quota. Indian buyers pay more COV
(psm) than the average in Indian quota-binding blocks, but pay below the average COV (psm)
in Chinese quota-binding blocks. The results are consistent with the earlier findings.
6.4. Within-Ethnicity Transactions and COV premium
The early results show significant increases in COV premium with a high concentration of
the own ethnicity group in a housing block. We argue that the results are not caused by the
supply constraints in the ethnic quota-binding conditions. Instead, we find incremental and
positive COV premiums in the interaction between buyers’ ethnicity and own ethnic quota, but
the opposite (negative) effects in the interaction between buyers’ ethnicity and other ethnic
quota. We argue that the convex relationship cannot be explained by neither the preference
for neighbors of the own ethnicity group (inverted U-shape curve as in Wong (2013)) nor the
supply of ethnic-based amenities.
We further argue that the results are driven by the ethnic social network, which is related
to preference matching between buyers and sellers in the search process. That is, buyers share
similar “taste” with sellers of the same ethnicity group in things, such as social amenities and
housing attributes. As a result, the ethnic social network increases housing price via matched
preference that exists only the within ethnicity group.
To explore the effect of ethnic social network hypothesis, we construct the repeat-sale
samples based on housing units sold twice or more times. We find 3,652 units sold twice, 99
units sold for 3 times, and 3 units sold for 4 times in our samples. For each pair of repeated
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housing transactions, we identify the ethnicity of seller, based on the buyer identity of the
same unit in the previous transaction. As a result, we are able to match buyer and seller
information for 3,859 repeated transactions, of which 289 are the cross-ethnicity transactions,
and 3,570 are the within-ethnicity transactions. Figure 6 shows the histograms of COV (psm)
for the within-ethnicity (Panel A) and the cross-ethnicity transactions (Panel B). There is a
discernible spike in the frequency at zero COV premium in both histograms. However, we find
that the frequency of zero COV transactions are higher in the cross-ethnicity group sample
(3.81%) than the within-ethnicity group sample (2.02%). The results indicate that buyers
and sellers are more likely to trade at appraisal prices (or at zero COV psm), when they
are from different ethnicity groups. The average COV (psm) in the within-ethnicity group
transactions estimated at SGD336.15 is higher than the average COV (psm) of SGD292.88
in the cross-ethnicity group transactions. The average COVs are shown by the vertical red
dotted line in the histograms. The difference in mean is statistically significant at a 1% level.
Based on the buyer and seller ethnicity identities, we can test the effects of the within-
ethnicity transaction on COV (psm) between buyers of the same ethnicity group those of the
different ethnicity group. Table 7 reports the panel regression results of the within-ethnicity
group transactions and the ethnicity quota on COV (psm). The dependent variable is the
COV (psm). Panel A reports the results using all buyers in the repeat sale samples. Column
(1) includes a dummy variable for the ethnicity quota. I Ethnicity Quota equals to 1 for the
transactions by buyers in their own ethnic quota binding blocks. The independent variables
include size (sqm), floor level, distance to nearest MRT, primary school quality within 1 km
radius and within 1-2 km radius. We also include the year fixed effects, the month fixed
effects, and the property type fixed effects. We find that the COV (psm) is higher when
buyers purchase housing units in blocks with the own ethnicity binding quota. Column (2)
includes a dummy variable for the within-ethnicity group transactions, where the Within
Ethnicity Transaction equals to 1, if a transaction is made between a buyer and a seller of
the same ethnicity type. We find that the within-ethnicity transactions have a higher COV
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(psm) than the cross-ethnicity transactions. Column (3) includes a dummy variable on the
within-ethnicity group transactions and its interaction with the ethnicity quota dummy. A
“horse-race” between the two factors is done to identify the dominant factor. We find that
the within-ethnicity transactions still show positive premiums on COV (psm) and the effect is
stronger in the within-ethnicity quota binding blocks. However, the coefficient on the ethnicity
quota dummy is negative, but statistically insignificant.
Panel B reports the results on Chinese buyers. Column (1) reports the result with the
Chinese buyer dummy interacted with a dummy for blocks with a binding Chinese quota.
The results are similar to those reported in column (1) in Table 4 but using the repeat sale
samples. We find significantly higher COV (psm), when Chinese buyers purchase units in
Chinese quota binding blocks. Column (2) includes the within-Chinese transaction dummy;
and we find significantly positive COV premiums for the within-Chinese group transactions,
even after controlling for the buyer ethnicity and the own ethnicity quota. Column (3) includes
the within-Chinese transaction dummy and its interaction with the Chinese quota dummy. We
find significant COV premiums in the within-Chinese transactions, and the effect is stronger
in the Chinese quota binding blocks. Column (4) includes both interactions in (2) and (3)
for a “horse-race” between the within-Chinese transaction and the Chinese buyers effects.
We find that Chinese buyers in the Chinese quota blocks is not sufficient to generate COV
premiums. However, when the seller is also a Chinese, the Chinese quota effect on COV
premiums becomes significant.
Panel C reports the results on Malay buyers using the same specification as in Panel B.
Column (1) shows that Malay buyers pay COV premiums when they purchase units in Malay
quota binding blocks. Column (3) shows that the within-Malay transactions itself show lower
COV (psm); but the within-Malay transactions in the Malay quota binding blocks show
positive COV premiums. In a horse-race between those two interactions in column (4), both
of them become statistically insignificant indicating that Malay buyers in the Malay quota
binding blocks is not a sufficient condition to produce COV premiums. Due to limited repeat
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sales sample for Indian buyers, the comparable analyses are not conducted for the Indian
group.14
Table 8 reports the panel regression results for the within-ethnicity group transactions and
the fraction of ethnicity group on COV (psm). Panel A reports the results on Chinese buyers.
Column (1) reports the result with the Chinese buyer dummy interacted with the fraction
of Chinese in a block. The independent variables include size (sqm), floor level, distance to
nearest MRT, primary school quality within 1 km radius, and within 1-2 km radius. We also
include the year fixed effects, the month fixed effects, and the property type fixed effects. The
results are similar those reported in column (1) in Panel B of Table 5 but using the repeat
sale samples. We find significantly higher COV (psm) for Chinese buyers in blocks with a
high fraction of Chinese. Column (2) adds the within-Chinese transaction dummy to column
(1); and we find significantly positive COV premiums in the within-Chinese transactions after
controlling for the effects of Chinese buyers and the Chinese fraction in the block. Column
(3) includes the within-Chinese transaction dummy and its interaction with the fraction of
Chinese. We find significant COV premium in the within-Chinese transactions, when the
fraction of Chinese increases. Column (4) includes both interactions in (2) and (3) for a
horse-race between the within-Chinese transaction and the Chinese buyer effects. We find
that Chinse buyer in a block with a high fraction of Chinese is not a condition that is strong
enough to generate COV premium. However, when the seller is also a Chinese, we find a
positive relationship between COV premiums and Chinese fraction in a block.
Panel B reports the results on Malay buyers using the same specification as in Panel A.
We find positive COV premiums that are associated with Malay buyer in blocks with a high
fraction of Malay. When a horse-race between the two interactions is done, Malay buyer
in blocks with a high fraction of Malay is a sufficient condition to produce COV premiums,
which is different from the results for the other ethnicity groups. Panel C reports the results
on Indian buyers using with same specification. Despite having only a small sample of Indian
14Our repeated sale samples consist only of 15 transactions in the blocks with an Indian quota.
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buyers (5%), we find that Indian buyer in blocks with a high fraction of Indian is not a sufficent
condition to generate COV premiums. When the seller is also an Indian, we find that COV
premiums are positively correlated with increases in the fraction of Indian.
Table 7 and Table 8 show positive and economically significant COV premiums with the
high ethnicity presence only if both buyers’ and sellers’ ethnicity types are matched. The
results are robust and consistent in models using both a discrete measure of the ethnicity
quota, and a continuous fraction measure of the block-level ethnicity group. The importance
of the within-ethnicity transaction supports the ethnic social network hypothesis via matching
ethnic preference.
6.5. Ethnic Social Network: Evidence in Transaction Volume
We have investigated the ethnic social network effects using the COV premiums as a pricing
mechanism. We further explore the ethnic social network effects using the transaction volume
mechanism in this section. The ethnic preference matching hypothesis predicts 1) a high COV
premium in the within-ethnicity transactions; and also 2) a high concentration of the within
ethnicity transactions. That is, the matching of the ethnic-specific taste should increase the
propensity of buyer and seller of the same ethnicity group to trade; and higher COV premiums
in the transaction should reflect the ethnic-specific values.
Figure 7 shows the distributions of ethnicity matching between buyers and seller in the
repeat sale samples. Panel A shows the number of transactions by the buyers’ and sellers’
ethnicity; and Panel B shows the fraction of transactions within the buyer ethnicity groups.
The first figures in both Panels show the ethnicity matching in all blocks. For buyers of
each ethnicity group, the numbers of transactions with Chinese, Malay, Indian, and Others
are shown. We find a high concentration of the within ethnicity transactions. 94.2% of the
Chinese buyers (2583 out of 2741) purchase units from Chinese sellers, 1.3% (37 out of 2741)
from Indian sellers, and 3.7% (101 out of 2741) from Malay sellers. 83.6% of the Indian buyers
(188 out of 225) purchase units from Indian sellers, 8% (18 out of 225) from Chinese sellers,
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and 4% (9 out of 225) from Malay sellers. 91.7% of the Malay buyers (778 out of 848) purchase
units from Malay sellers, 6.7% (57 out of 848) from Chinese sellers, and 1.4% (12 out of 848)
from Indian buyers.
We decompose the matching frequency between buyers and sellers in the ethnicity quota
binding blocks. In the Chinese quota blocks (top right-hand figures in both panels), 98% of the
Chinese buyers purchase units from Chinese sellers, 0.7% from Indian sellers, and 0.9% from
Malay sellers. It is as expected to have a high concentration of Chinese transactions in Chinese
quota binding blocks. Combined with the early findings of the positive COV premiums in the
within-ethnicity transactions in own ethnicity quota blocks, this evidence supports the ethnic
social network effects via the preference matching channel.
The same prediction, however, arises from the ethnic social network hypothesis through in-
formation spillover channel. The evidence on COV premium and concentration of transactions
within ethnicity is also likely to happen through information spillover channel, which happens
among people speaking same language and/or with same education background (Bertrand
et al. (2000)). That is, if the ethnic-specific information flows through the network, it will
be empirically inseparable between two channels, at least based on our data. Then what we
find will be just a special case of the information spillovers story within ethnicity but not the
effect of ethnic social network.
Interestingly, we find the same concentration in the other ethnicity buyers in Chinese quota
binding blocks. In Chinese quota binding blocks, 81% of the Indian buyers purchase units
from Indian sellers, 8.6% from Chinese sellers, and 3.4% from Malay sellers. Similarly, 90.1%
of the Malay buyers purchase units from Malay sellers, 6.2% from Chinese sellers, and 3.7%
from Indian sellers. Why do Malays trade with other Malays only and Indians trade with
other Indians only in Chinese quota binding blocks that have more Chinese amenities? Given
that Indian buyers and Malay buyers pay COV discounts for the within-ethnicity transac-
tions in Chinese quota binding blocks, the high within ethnicity transaction volumes do not
fit the preference matching and/or information spillovers stories; however, they support the
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pure ethnic social network effects after controlling for preference matching and information
spillovers. We find similar concentrations in Malay and Indian quota binding blocks.
The pure ethnic social network effect, which is orthogonal to information spillover, should
predict 1) increases in the intensity of transactions within the ethnicity group; but 2) no
COV premium associated with the within ethnicity transaction since no information spillover
and/or no matched preference are generated in the transactions. For example, if buyers and
sellers from the same ethnicity group use real estate agents of the same ethnicity group, we
expect the increase in the intensity of the within-ethnicity transactions without increasing
the COV premiums.15 Buyers and sellers may still be more comfortable to communicate
in their own native languages in housing transactions, despite the fact that English is a
prevalent business language spoken in Singapore’s society. Efficient communication facilitates
negotiations between buyers and sellers of the same ethnicity group relative to those from
different ethnicity groups. The existence of pure ethnic social network implies that the search
friction in the housing market is one possible factor contributing to the racial segregation in
the housing market.
7. Conclusion
This paper investigates the ethnic social network in Singapore’s resale public housing mar-
ket. Based on a unique dataset containing information on Cash-Over-Valuation (COV) for
73,107 resale public housing transactions from 2007 to 2012, we find that COV per square
meter (psm), which measures the differences between transaction prices and appraisal values,
significantly increases with the presence of buyers’ own ethnic group in housing blocks. The
results coincide with the view that buyers value cultural amenities in housing blocks with a
high concentration of residents of the same ethnicity group.
However, we also find a strong convexity in COV premiums with respect to the ethnicity
15They may use ethnic-specific real estate web-portal or real estate agents to facilitate transactions within
the ethnicity group.
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presence, which can not be fully explained by ethnic-based factors, such as cultural amenities,
preference on the own ethnicity group, and supply constraints. Using repeat sale samples, we
find that preference matching between buyers and sellers through the ethnic social network is
a key condition for the convex COV premiums. In other words, the value of cultural amenities
are embedded into transaction price, only if buyers and sellers share common preferences.
Lastly, we find an extremely high concentration of transactions within the ethnicity groups.
The results are found not only in the own-ethnicity concentrated blocks, but also in other-
ethnicity concentrated blocks. The results support the ethnic social network hypothesis, which
predicts a higher transaction volume in the within ethnicity group than in the cross ethnicity
group. A high concentration of the within ethnicity group in blocks without having common
preferences, i.e. blocks with quota on other ethnicity group, indicates the importance of the
pure ethnic social network in housing market; and the existence of such network could cause
disconnection and aggravate segregation in housing markets.
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Table 1: Population Composition of Singapore and the Ethnic Integration Policy
We report the population composition of Singapore in 1989 and 2010 and the maximum ethnic limits imposed
by the Ethnic Integration Policy. From March 1989, the Ethnic Integration Policy imposed maximum ethnic
limits in neighborhoods and blocks in Singapore. In March 2010, the limit for Indian group has been increased
from 10% to 12% for neighborhoods and from 13% to 15% for blocks.
Population Composition Maximum Ethnic Limits
1989 2010 From 1 March 1989 From 5 March 2010
Ethnic Group Neighborhood Block Neighborhood Block
Chinese 77.80% 74.10% 84.00% 87.00% 84.00% 87.00%
Malays 14.20% 13.40% 22.00% 25.00% 22.00% 25.00%
Indians 7.00% 9.20% 10.00% 13.00% 12.00% 15.00%
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
We construct our data by merging the public housing resale transaction data from Singapore Real Estate
Exchange to a proprietary big database on Singapore residents. Our sample period is from 2007 to 2012.
Panel A reports the composition of buyers in our data. There are four groups of buyers identified: Chinese
buyer, Malay buyer, Indian buyer, and Other buyers. Panel B reports the summary statistics of variables we
use in our analysis. Appraisal Value is an appraisal of a house from a panel of accredited appraisals, which
is similar to the standard hedonic models. Appraisal Value (psm) is the Appraisal Price per square meter.
COV is the cash over valuation, which is the difference between the final agreed price and the appraisal value.
COV (psm) is the COV per square meter. Unit floor is the floor level of a house. Size (sqm) is the size of a
house. Distance to Nearest MRT is the linear distance of a house to the nearest mass rapid transit (MRT)
station. Primary School Quality within 1 km radius is the average school quality around 1 km radius from
a house, based on the Primary School Leaving Examination results. Primary School Quality within 1-2 km
radius is the average school quality in 1-2 km radius from a house. Panel C reports the type of property in
our data. There are 8 types of properties: 1 Rooms, 2 Rooms, 3 Rooms, 4 Rooms, 5 Rooms, HUDC, Jumbo,
and Executive. For the robustness of the empirical analyses, we winsorize Appraisal Value and COV at the
1% level on both tails.
Panel A: Buyer Composition
Chinese Malay Indian Others Total
53,229 15,184 3,801 893 73,107
72.81% 20.77% 5.2% 1.22% 100%
Panel B: Summary Statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Appraisal Value 73,107 382,406 117,557 169,000 750,000
Appraisal Value (psm) 73,107 3,927.30 973.87 1,198.63 11,538.46
COV 73,107 24,136 18,840 -22,000 90,000
COV (psm) 73,107 253.47 191.84 -550.00 1,538.46
Unit Floor 73,107 7.55 4.80 1.00 40.00
Size (sqm) 73,107 99.00 25.19 31.00 243.00
Distance to Nearest MRT 73,107 0.89 0.55 0.04 3.52
Primary School Quality within 1 km radius 71,057 -0.10 0.60 -0.85 3.66
Primary School Quality within 1-2 km radius 72,208 -0.11 0.42 -0.85 3.54
Panel C: Property Type
1 Rooms 2 Rooms 3 Rooms 4 Rooms
137 433 19,356 27,085
0.19% 0.59% 26.48% 37.05%
5 Rooms HUDC Jumbo Executive
19,291 42 38 6,725
26.39% 0.06% 0.05% 9.20%
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Table 3: Ethnicity Presence in Blocks
In Panel A, we report the summary statistics of ethnicity presence in blocks. In Singapore, the postal-code system assigns a unique 6 digit postal
code for each housing block and we have 8194 blocks in our sample. We report summary statistics of the fraction of Chinese, Malay, and Indian
residents in each block. Panel B reports the determinants of the ethnicity fractions in blocks. In columns (1)-(3), we report the linear regression
results of various determinants on the ethnicity fraction. In column (1), we use the fraction of Chinese residents in a block as a dependent variable.
Independent variables include Distance to nearest MRT, Primary School Quality within 1 km radius, Primary School Quality within 1-2 km radius,
Average Unit Size (sqm) in a Block, and Maximum Building Floor. In column (2), we use the fraction of Malay residents in a block as a dependent
variable. In column (3), we use the fraction of Indian residents in a block as a dependent variable. In Columns (4)-(6), we report the logit regression
results of various determinants on the ethnicity quota. As reported in Table 1, Chinese ethnicity quota binds if a block has more than 87% Chinese
residents, Malay ethnicity quota binds if a block has more than 25% Malay residents, and Indian ethnicity quota binds if a block has more than 13%
or 15%. In column (4), we use the Chinese quota as a dependent variable. In column (5), we use the Malay quota as a dependent variable. In column
(6), we use the Indian quota as a dependent variable. The table reports point estimates with heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics in parentheses.
***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance.
Panel A: Fraction of Ethnicity in Blocks
Obs Mean Std. Dev. p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Fraction of Chinese 8,194 79.95 9.84 66.99 73.33 81.38 87.56 91.03
Fraction of Malay 8,194 15.13 9.57 3.76 7.44 13.89 21.92 27.82
Fraction of Indian 8,194 3.82 2.96 0.86 1.87 3.33 5.13 7.12
Panel B: Determinants of Ethnicity Presence in Blocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction of Fraction of Fraction of Chinese Malay Indian
Variables Chinese Malay Indian Quota Quota Quota
Distance to nearest MRT -2.846*** 3.103*** -0.223*** -0.858*** 0.489*** 0.0622
(-15.51) (17.67) (-3.735) (-14.56) (8.444) (0.240)
Primary School Quality within 1km radius 1.575*** -1.762*** 0.0826 0.294*** -0.420*** -0.458*
(9.883) (-11.03) (1.529) (6.668) (-6.928) (-1.889)
Primary School Quality within 1-2km radius 2.597*** -2.495*** -0.170** 0.454*** -0.638*** -1.424***
(10.21) (-10.22) (-2.409) (7.116) (-6.744) (-3.424)
Average Unit Size (sqm) in a Block -0.0219*** -0.00331 0.0198*** -0.00525*** -3.80e-05 0.0156***
(-4.629) (-0.726) (9.699) (-4.709) (-0.0310) (4.282)
Maximum Building Floor 0.593*** -0.508*** -0.0745*** 0.0839*** -0.141*** -0.401***
(25.47) (-22.77) (-8.549) (15.64) (-19.30) (-11.59)
Constant 78.11*** 18.35*** 2.818*** -0.672*** -0.672*** -3.498***
(136.8) (33.11) (14.45) (-5.262) (-4.525) (-6.732)
Observations 7,864 7,864 7,864 7,864 7,864 7,864
R-squared 0.134 0.115 0.043
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Table 4: COV and the Blocks with Ethnicity Quota
We report the panel regressions of buyer’s ethnicity and the presence of same ethnicity group in the block
(discrete measure) on COV per square meter (COVpsm). The dependent variable is COVpsm, winsorized at
1% level. Column (1) includes a dummy variable for Chinese buyer (I Buyer Ethnicity) and an interaction of
the Chinese buyer dummy with dummies for ethnicity quota on the block. I Chinese Quota equals 1 if the
block has binding Chinese quota and equals 0 otherwise. I Malay Quota equals 1 if the block has binding
Chinese quota and equals 0 otherwise. I Indian Quota equals 1 if the block has binding Chinese quota and
equals 0 otherwise. Independent variables include Size (sqm) and Unit Floor. We also include year fixed
effects, month fixed effects, block fixed effects, and property type fixed effects. Since we have block level fixed
effect, we cannot identify the effect of ethnicity quota itself but we still can identify the interaction. Column
(2) is about Malay buyer and column (3) is about Indian buyer with same setup as in column (1). The table
reports point estimates with heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%,
and 10% statistical significance.
Dependent Variable: COVpsm
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Chinese Buyer Malay Buyer Indian Buyer
I Buyer Ethnicity 42.43*** -46.54*** -11.50***
(25.65) (-25.88) (-3.669)
I Buyer Ethnicity × I Chinese Quota 44.20*** -46.18*** -57.34***
(11.03) (-9.577) (-8.449)
I Buyer Ethnicity × I Malay Quota -11.30*** 14.86*** 8.086
(-3.859) (4.894) (1.265)
I Buyer Ethnicity × I Indian Quota -36.48* 32.31 1.693
(-1.958) (1.586) (0.0711)
I Indian Quota -5.425 -37.73 -27.72
(-0.195) (-1.439) (-1.080)
Size (sqm) -0.644*** -0.649*** -0.603***
(-4.826) (-4.864) (-4.499)
Unit Floor 7.470*** 7.593*** 8.497***
(48.20) (49.06) (55.98)
Observations 73,107 73,107 73,107
R-squared 0.486 0.485 0.477
Block FE Yes Yes Yes
Year, Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Property Type FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5: COV and the Fraction of Ethnicity Presence
We report the panel regressions of buyer’s ethnicity and the presence of same ethnicity group in the block (continuous measure) on COV per square
meter (COVpsm). The dependent variable is COVpsm, winsorized at 1% level. Panel A reports the results with block fixed effects. Columns (1)-(3)
include a dummy variable for Chinese buyer (I Buyer Ethnicity) and an interaction of the Chinese buyer dummy with the fractions of Chinese, Malay
and Indian in the block. In column (1), we interact Chinese buyer dummy with the fraction of Chinese in each block. Independent variables include
Size (sqm) and Unit Floor. We also include year fixed effects, month fixed effects, block fixed effects, and property type fixed effects. Since we have
block level fixed effect, we cannot identify the effect of ethnicity fraction itself but we still can identify the interaction. In column (2), we interact
Chinese buyer dummy with the fraction of Maly residents in each block. In column (3), we interact Chinese buyer dummy with the fraction of
Indian residents in each block. Columns (4)-(6) use Malay buyer dummy and Columns (7)-(9) use Indian buyer dummy. Panel B reports the results
without block fixed effects. Specifications are similar to Panel A except block fixed effects and additional independent variables such as Distance to
nearest MRT, Primary School Quality within 1 km radius, Primary School Quality within 1-2 km radius. The table reports point estimates with
heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance.
Panel A: With Block Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: COVpsm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variables Chinese Buyer Malay Buyer Indian Buyer
I Buyer Ethnicity -114.8*** 83.48*** 54.38*** 114.6*** -90.39*** -54.50*** 173.0*** -64.62*** -26.75***
(-10.14) (25.80) (22.57) (9.385) (-23.96) (-21.30) (8.027) (-11.76) (-5.032)
I Buyer Ethnicity × Fraction of Chinese 2.091*** -2.137*** -2.490***
(14.10) (-13.19) (-8.993)
I Buyer Ethnicity × Fraction of Malay -2.049*** 2.200*** 2.682***
(-13.33) (12.83) (9.252)
I Buyer Ethnicity × Fraction of Indian -1.911*** 1.704*** 0.587
(-3.640) (2.967) (0.595)
Size (sqm) -0.632*** -0.638*** -0.633*** -0.640*** -0.646*** -0.639*** -0.597*** -0.597*** -0.595***
(-4.741) (-4.774) (-4.730) (-4.800) (-4.841) (-4.784) (-4.450) (-4.453) (-4.428)
Unit Floor 7.415*** 7.432*** 7.476*** 7.550*** 7.561*** 7.624*** 8.484*** 8.483*** 8.512***
(47.79) (47.91) (48.13) (48.73) (48.82) (49.20) (55.88) (55.88) (56.04)
Observations 73,107 73,107 73,107 73,107 73,107 73,107 73,107 73,107 73,107
R-squared 0.486 0.486 0.485 0.485 0.485 0.484 0.477 0.477 0.476
Block FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year, Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Property Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5 Continues
Panel B: Without Block Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: COVpsm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variables Chinese Buyer Malay Buyer Indian Buyer
I Buyer Ethnicity -126.2*** 89.74*** 57.66*** 129.0*** -97.81*** -54.57*** 163.8*** -63.24*** -37.05***
(-11.67) (29.19) (23.90) (11.20) (-27.93) (-21.82) (7.602) (-11.75) (-6.913)
I Buyer Ethnicity × Fraction of Chinese 2.263*** -2.346*** -2.403***
(16.04) (-15.42) (-8.723)
I Buyer Ethnicity × Fraction of Malay -2.291*** 2.530*** 2.295***
(-15.73) (15.90) (8.032)
I Buyer Ethnicity × Fraction of Indian -0.755 -0.708 2.414**
(-1.391) (-1.240) (2.338)
Fraction of Chinese -0.0422 2.045*** 2.120***
(-0.363) (25.58) (29.69)
Fraction of Malay 0.0286 -2.069*** -2.168***
(0.237) (-25.28) (-29.59)
Fraction of Indian -0.0973 -1.069*** -0.780***
(-0.218) (-3.521) (-2.841)
Distance to nearest MRT -28.34*** -28.05*** -32.04*** -28.40*** -28.21*** -32.17*** -29.84*** -29.36*** -34.32***
(-25.72) (-25.41) (-28.86) (-25.75) (-25.55) (-28.99) (-26.97) (-26.48) (-30.74)
Primary School Quality within 1km radius 13.17*** 12.95*** 15.32*** 12.98*** 12.82*** 15.10*** 13.46*** 13.20*** 16.28***
(11.71) (11.51) (13.63) (11.50) (11.35) (13.40) (11.83) (11.59) (14.32)
Primary School Quality within 1-2km radius 8.294*** 8.351*** 11.25*** 7.978*** 8.138*** 10.94*** 8.220*** 8.303*** 12.13***
(4.734) (4.774) (6.447) (4.538) (4.637) (6.248) (4.636) (4.689) (6.864)
Size (sqm) -0.330*** -0.377*** -0.609*** -0.337*** -0.396*** -0.591*** -0.295*** -0.349*** -0.681***
(-4.178) (-4.800) (-7.760) (-4.267) (-5.063) (-7.538) (-3.702) (-4.398) (-8.590)
Unit Floor 7.015*** 7.049*** 7.430*** 7.154*** 7.208*** 7.561*** 8.002*** 8.020*** 8.636***
(47.00) (47.31) (49.61) (48.04) (48.50) (50.61) (54.94) (55.14) (59.46)
Observations 70,197 70,197 70,197 70,197 70,197 70,197 70,197 70,197 70,197
R-squared 0.355 0.355 0.348 0.353 0.353 0.347 0.343 0.343 0.334
Block FE No No No No No No No No No
Year, Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Property Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 6: COV and the Convexity with the Fraction of Ethnicity Presence
We report the panel regressions of buyer’s ethnicity and the presence of same ethnicity group in the block (continuous measure) and its square term
on COV per square meter (COVpsm). Dependent variable is COVpsm, winsorized at 1% level. Columns (1)-(3) report results with block fixed
effects. Column (1) includes a dummy variable for Chinese buyer (I Buyer Ethnicity) and interactions of the Chinese buyer dummy with the fraction
of Chinese and its square term. Independent variables include Size (sqm) and Unit Floor. We also include year fixed effects, month fixed effects,
block fixed effects, and property type fixed effects. Since we have block level fixed effect, we cannot identify the effect of ethnicity fraction and its
square term but we still can identify the interactions. Column (2) is about Malay buyer and column (3) is about Indian buyer. Columns (4)-(6)
report results without block fixed effects. Specifications are similar to columns (1)-(3) except block fixed effects and additional independent variables
such as Distance to nearest MRT, Primary School Quality within 1 km radius, Primary School Quality within 1-2 km radius. The table reports point
estimates with heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance.
Dependent Variable: COVpsm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Chinese Buyer Malay Buyer Indian Buyer Chinese Buyer Malay Buyer Indian Buyer
I Buyer Ethnicity 291.4*** -99.43*** -47.37*** 270.6*** -101.3*** -59.85***
(3.936) (-24.48) (-8.062) (4.106) (-25.73) (-10.04)
I Buyer Ethnicity × Fraction of Buyer Ethnicity -8.719*** 3.326*** 7.881*** -8.063*** 3.609*** 10.75***
(-4.404) (13.73) (6.868) (-4.594) (15.28) (8.978)
I Buyer Ethnicity × (Fraction of Buyer Ethnicity)2 0.0709*** 0.0318*** 0.631*** 0.0663*** 0.0434*** 0.731***
(5.399) (6.874) (10.22) (5.708) (9.594) (11.09)
Fraction of Buyer Ethnicity 1.157 -4.224*** -3.746***
(0.870) (-18.03) (-4.173)
Square of Fraction of Buyer Ethnicity -0.00805 0.0250*** -0.281***
(-0.900) (4.041) (-2.993)
Distance to nearest MRT -27.71*** -27.40*** -33.95***
(-25.08) (-24.77) (-30.39)
Primary School Quality within 1km radius 13.26*** 12.58*** 16.05***
(11.80) (11.13) (14.15)
Primary School Quality within 1-2km radius 8.094*** 7.828*** 12.18***
(4.613) (4.460) (6.900)
Size (sqm) -0.635*** -0.646*** -0.624*** -0.343*** -0.419*** -0.668***
(-4.772) (-4.841) (-4.654) (-4.349) (-5.375) (-8.302)
Unit Floor 7.428*** 7.521*** 8.301*** 7.019*** 7.166*** 8.428***
(47.89) (48.50) (54.15) (47.11) (48.23) (57.18)
Observations 73,107 73,107 73,107 70,197 70,197 70,197
R-squared 0.487 0.485 0.478 0.356 0.355 0.338
Block FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Year, Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Property Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7: Effects of Within-Ethnicity Group Transactions and Ethnicity Quota
We report the panel regression of within-ethnicity group transactions and ethnicity quota on COV per square
meter (COVpsm). The dependent variable is COVpsm, winsorized at 1% level. Panel A reports the results
using all buyers in the repeated sale subsample. Column (1) includes a dummy variable for ethnicity quota.
I Ethnicity Quota equals to 1 for the transactions by buyers in blocks with their own ethnic quota. Independent
variables include Size (sqm), Unit Floor, Distance to nearest MRT, Primary School Quality within 1 km radius,
and Primary School Quality within 1-2 km radius. We also include year fixed effects, month fixed effects, and
property type fixed effects. For simplicity, we do not report the coefficients on control variables. Column (2)
includes a dummy variable for within-ethnicity group transactions. Within Ethnicity Transaction equals to
1 if the transaction is done between same ethnicity buyer and seller. Column (3) includes a dummy variable
within-ethnicity group transactions and its interaction with the dummy for the ethnicity quota. Panel B reports
the results on Chinese buyers. Column (1) reports the result with Chinese buyer dummy interacted with a
dummy for Chinese quota. Column (2) additionally includes within-Chinese transaction dummy to column
(1). Column (3) includes within-Chinese transaction dummy and its interaction with a dummy for Chinese
quota without having the interaction between Chinese quota dummy and Chinese buyer dummy. Column (4)
includes both interactions in (2) and (3). Panel C reports the results on Malay buyers. Specifications are same
as in Panel B. The table reports point estimates with heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***,
**, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance.
Panel A: All Buyers (1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: COVpsm
I Ethnicity Quota 30.36*** -26.01
(4.683) (-0.921)
Within Ethnicity Transaction 29.99*** 19.18*
(3.132) (1.870)
Within Ethnicity Transaction × I Ethnicity Quota 57.36**
(1.978)
Panel B: Chinese Buyers (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: COVpsm
I Chinese Quota -11.19 -10.81 -12.61 -10.78
(-0.789) (-0.762) (-0.956) (-0.759)
I Chinese Buyer 44.63*** -4.217 0.318 2.213
(7.189) (-0.333) (0.0256) (0.165)
I Chinese Buyer × I Chinese Quota 53.55*** 50.95*** -20.01
(3.285) (3.127) (-0.605)
I Within Chinese Transaction 53.38*** 48.11*** 46.47***
(4.338) (3.879) (3.531)
I Within Chinese Transaction × I Chinese Quota 54.62*** 72.79**
(3.524) (2.355)
Panel C: Malay Buyers (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: COVpsm
I Malay Quota -47.41*** -47.49*** -46.26*** -47.48***
(-6.216) (-6.227) (-6.148) (-6.225)
I Malay Buyer -64.06*** -31.88 -17.36 -26.30
(-8.258) (-1.583) (-0.870) (-1.132)
I Malay Buyer × I Malay Quota 59.02*** 60.18*** 37.17
(4.620) (4.705) (0.842)
I Within Malay Transaction -35.71* -50.64** -41.91*
(-1.747) (-2.406) (-1.740)
I Within Malay Transaction × I Malay Quota 60.75*** 24.80
(4.686) (0.553)45
Table 8: Effects of Within-Ethnicity Group Transactions and Ethnicity Fraction
We report the panel regression of within-ethnicity group transactions and the fraction of ethnicity group on
COV per square meter (COVpsm). The dependent variable is COVpsm, winsorized at 1% level. Panel A
reports the results on Chinese buyers. Column (1) reports the result with Chinese buyer dummy interacted
with the fraction of Chinese in a block. Independent variables include Size (sqm), Unit Floor, Distance to
nearest MRT, Primary School Quality within 1 km radius, and Primary School Quality within 1-2 km radius.
We also include buyer ethnicity fixed effects, year fixed effects, month fixed effects, and property type fixed
effects. For simplicity, we do not report the coefficients on control variables. Column (2) additionally includes
within-Chinese transaction dummy to column (1). Column (3) includes within-Chinese transaction dummy
and its interaction with the fraction of Chinese without having the interaction between the fraction of Chinese
and Chinese buyer dummy. Column (4) includes both interactions in (2) and (3). Panel B reports the results
on Malay buyers and Panel C reports the results on Indian buyers. Specifications are same as in Panel A. The
table reports point estimates with heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes 1%,
5%, and 10% statistical significance.
Panel A: Chinese Buyers (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: COVpsm
I Chinese Buyer -193.8*** -229.6*** 0.554 18.04
(-4.443) (-5.135) (0.0445) (0.148)
Fraction of Chinese -0.363 -0.352 -0.378 -0.357
(-0.812) (-0.786) (-0.878) (-0.796)
I Chinese Buyer × Fraction of Chinese 3.165*** 3.032*** -0.230
(5.521) (5.298) (-0.146)
I Within Chinese Transaction 50.08*** -196.3*** -212.1*
(4.050) (-4.297) (-1.750)
I Within Chinese Transaction × Fraction of Chinese 3.236*** 3.445**
(5.714) (2.210)
Panel B: Malay Buyers (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: COVpsm
I Malay Buyer -109.9*** -77.65*** -12.68 -81.23
(-7.222) (-3.225) (-0.624) (-1.593)
Fraction of Malay -2.712*** -2.718*** -2.616*** -2.718***
(-7.396) (-7.412) (-7.222) (-7.411)
I Malay Buyer × Fraction of Malay 3.400*** 3.466*** 3.655*
(5.173) (5.281) (1.653)
I Within Malay Transaction -36.82* -99.82*** -32.86
(-1.811) (-3.892) (-0.627)
I Within Malay Transaction × Fraction of Malay 3.346*** -0.209
(5.022) (-0.0925)
Panel C: Indian Buyers (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: COVpsm
I Indian Buyer -16.24 8.538 -4.240 100.1**
(-0.734) (0.283) (-0.163) (2.493)
Fraction of Indian -0.232 -0.240 -0.658 -0.229
(-0.145) (-0.150) (-0.409) (-0.143)
I Indian Buyer × Fraction of Indian -3.418 -3.116 -24.99***
(-0.727) (-0.646) (-3.706)
I Within Indian Transaction -31.39 -42.51 -145.4***
(-1.140) (-1.267) (-3.250)
I Within Indian Transaction × Fraction of Indian 1.989 26.57***
(0.442) (3.411)46
Figure 1: Histogram of COV (psm)
The figure shows the histogram of COV (psm) of our data from 2007 to 2012. COV is the cash over valuation,
which is the difference between the final agreed price and the appraisal value. COV (psm) is the COV per
square meter. Average COV (psm) is reported with red-dot line.
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Figure 2: Time Series Variation in COV
The figure shows the time trend of average COV (psm) and the ratio of COV to total transaction price during
the sample period. Average COV (psm) is reported in blue-dash line with the scale on the left. The ratio of
COV to total transaction price is reported in red-solid line with the scale on the right.
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Figure 3: Compositions of Singapore’s Resident Populations (1980-2016)
The figure shows the composition of Singapore’s resident population from 1980 to 2016. The fractions of
Chinese, Malay, and Indian are reported. The data is from the Department of Statistics Singapore.
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Figure 4: Convexity in COV with the Fraction of Ethnicity
The figure shows the convexity in COV associated with the fraction of ethnicity group. Panel A reports the
average COV (psm) paid by Chinese, Malay, and Indian by the fraction of Chinese. We include the locally
weighted smoothed fit (lowess) for the scatter plot. Panel B reports the average COV (psm) paid by Chinese,
Malay, and Indian by the fraction of Malay. Panel C reports the average COV (psm) paid by Chinese, Malay,
and Indian by the fraction of Indian.
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Figure 5: Time Series Variations in COV with Ethnicity Quota
The figure shows the difference in COV (psm) for ethnicity quota by year. We expand Table 4 for the estimates
and they are reported in Appendix Table 2. Panel A reports the differences in COV (psm) that Chinese buyer
pays in each ethnicity quota. Black solid line shows the average COV (psm) that Chinese buyers pays in all
blocks. Red long-dash line shows the average COV (psm) that Chinese buyer pays in Chinese quota blocks.
Blue short-dash line shows the average COV (psm) that Chinese buyer pays in Malay quota blocks. Green
dot line shows the average COV (psm) that Chinese buyer pays in Indian quota blocks. Panel B reports the
difference in COV (psm) that Malay buyers pays in each ethnicity quota. Panel C reports the difference in
COV (psm) that Indian buyers pays in each ethnicity quota.
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Figure 6: Histogram of COV (psm): Within- vs Cross- Ethnicity Transactions
The figure shows the distributions of COV (psm) for within-ethnicity transactions and for cross-ethnicity
transactions. We use repeated sale subsample to identify seller and buyer ethnicity group. Panel A reports the
histogram of COV (psm) for within-ethnicity transactions. The average COV (psm) of 3570 within-ethnicity
transactions is SGD336.15, which is reported with vertical red dot line. Panel B reports the histogram of
COV (psm) for cross-ethnicity transactions. The average COV (psm) of 289 within-ethnicity transactions is
SGD292.88, which is reported with vertical red dot line.
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Figure 7: Matching between Ethnicity Groups
The figure reports the distribution of ethnicity matching between buyers and seller. We use repeated sale
subsample to identify seller and buyer ethnicity group. Panel A reports the number of transactions by buyers’
and sellers’ ethnicity. First figure reports the matching between ethnicity groups in all blocks. For each
ethnicity buyer, numbers of transactions with Chinese, Malay, Indian, and Others are reported. Second figure
reports the matching in Chinese quota blocks, third figure reports the matching in Malay quota blocks, and
fourth figure reports the matching in Indian quota blocks. Panel B reports the fraction of seller ethnicity for
each ethnicity buyer from Panel A.
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Appendix Table 1: Distribution of Ethnicity Quotas in Singapore
We report the spatial distribution of ethnicity quotas in Singapore. HDB Town is a collection of neighbor-
hoods/blocks and there are 26 HDB town in Singapore. Out of 8194 blocks in our sample, there are 2280
blocks with Chinese quota, 1368 blocks with Malay quota, and 82 blocks with Indian quota.
HDB Town Chinese Quota Malay Quota Indian Quota Total
Ang Mo Kio 235 4 1 332
Bedok 36 146 1 462
Bishan 147 1 3 222
Bukit Batok 39 79 7 342
Bukit Merah 272 1 2 336
Bukit Panjang 30 15 5 288
Bukit Timah 22 0 0 26
Central Area 42 0 4 59
Choa Chu Kang 26 41 1 441
Clementi 54 13 0 167
Geylang 88 46 1 232
Hougang 274 2 4 518
Jurong East 37 36 2 214
Jurong West 61 129 4 640
Kallang/Whampoa 144 6 8 240
Marine Parade 10 3 0 52
Pasir Ris 12 154 1 400
Punggol 73 0 0 166
Queenstown 108 1 1 176
Sembawang 18 0 0 167
Sengkang 193 0 0 395
Serangoon 109 1 3 229
Tampines 15 278 0 684
Toa Payoh 181 1 4 267
Woodlands 2 356 14 607
Yishun 36 54 14 492
Total 2,280 1,368 82 8,194
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Appendix Table 2: Distribution of Ethnicity Quotas in Singapore
We expand the results in Table 4 by year for Figure 5. We report the panel regressions of buyer’s ethnicity
and the presence of same ethnicity group in the block (discrete measure) on COV per square meter (COVpsm)
by year. The dependent variable is COVpsm, winsorized at 1% level. Column (1) includes a dummy variable
for Chinese buyer (I Buyer Ethnicity) interacted with year dummies and interactions of them with dummies
for ethnicity quota on the block. I Chinese Quota equals 1 if the block has binding Chinese quota and equals
0 otherwise. I Malay Quota equals 1 if the block has binding Chinese quota and equals 0 otherwise. I Indian
Quota equals 1 if the block has binding Chinese quota and equals 0 otherwise. Independent variables include
Size (sqm) and Unit Floor. We also include year fixed effects, month fixed effects, block fixed effects, and
property type fixed effects. Column (2) is about Malay buyer and column (3) is about Indian buyer with
same setup as in column (1). The table reports point estimates with heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics in
parentheses. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance.
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Chinese Buyer Malay Buyer Indian Buyer
I Buyer Ethnicity × I 2007 -89.24*** -172.2*** -126.4***
(-27.81) (-33.34) (-13.16)
I Buyer Ethnicity × I 2008 2.216 -75.83*** -37.61***
(0.795) (-14.17) (-4.335)
I Buyer Ethnicity × I 2009 -108.3*** -157.0*** -134.8***
(-43.27) (-40.97) (-17.47)
I Buyer Ethnicity × I 2010 82.73*** 7.536* 49.74***
(32.53) (1.781) (6.714)
I Buyer Ethnicity × I 2011 117.0*** 41.96*** 76.08***
(43.53) (12.07) (10.80)
I Buyer Ethnicity × I 2012 98.13*** 21.53*** 41.27***
(38.69) (6.812) (6.452)
I Buyer Ethnicity × I 2007 × I Chinese Quota 86.27*** -49.10** -56.23***
(12.17) (-2.427) (-2.592)
I Buyer Ethnicity × I 2008 × I Chinese Quota 35.46*** -47.19*** -60.68***
(5.813) (-3.116) (-2.655)
I Buyer Ethnicity × I 2009 × I Chinese Quota -7.167 -65.14*** -55.08***
(-1.283) (-5.591) (-3.585)
I Buyer Ethnicity × I 2010 × I Chinese Quota 47.48*** -36.64*** -42.12**
(8.637) (-2.794) (-2.470)
I Buyer Ethnicity × I 2011 × I Chinese Quota 43.88*** -55.34*** -89.05***
(7.639) (-5.856) (-5.987)
I Buyer Ethnicity × I 2012 × I Chinese Quota 67.15*** -41.25*** -35.49***
(12.01) (-4.873) (-2.674)
I Buyer Ethnicity × I 2007 × I Malay Quota -29.23*** 1.926 -21.62
(-4.920) (0.237) (-1.026)
I Buyer Ethnicity × I 2008 × I Malay Quota -4.704 -7.528 -5.690
(-0.848) (-0.928) (-0.342)
I Buyer Ethnicity × I 2009 × I Malay Quota 16.04*** 20.15*** 28.57**
(3.287) (3.278) (1.970)
I Buyer Ethnicity × I 2010 × I Malay Quota -26.50*** 4.576 -24.08
(-5.387) (0.678) (-1.557)
I Buyer Ethnicity × I 2011 × I Malay Quota -5.469 18.77*** 22.23
(-0.998) (3.116) (1.530)
I Buyer Ethnicity × I 2012 × I Malay Quota -14.02*** 11.20** 11.23
(-2.842) (2.167) (0.893)
I Buyer Ethnicity × I 2007 × I Indian Quota -33.99 53.99 -46.46
(-0.787) (1.153) (-0.811)
I Buyer Ethnicity × I 2008 × I Indian Quota 17.75 -60.65 12.48
(0.430) (-1.206) (0.442)
I Buyer Ethnicity × I 2009 × I Indian Quota -6.741 88.35*** 136.7
(-0.224) (2.938) (1.558)
I Buyer Ethnicity × I 2010 × I Indian Quota -30.16 88.57 -7.536
(-1.091) (1.401) (-0.144)
I Buyer Ethnicity × I 2011 × I Indian Quota 14.26 -8.672 67.83
(0.305) (-0.153) (0.905)
I Buyer Ethnicity × I 2012 × I Indian Quota -30.50 -8.498 -4.561
(-0.691) (-0.151) (-0.125)
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